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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY CO·., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff a;n,d Appella.nt, 
-vs.-
LEijAND J. THOMPSON, 
Defendant and R,espondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as the respondent-defendant Leland J. 
Thompson controverts the appellant's statement of facts 
in certain particulars, he is obliged to 1nake his own 
statement on controverted matters. 
At the outset it n1ust be noted that this action is 
essentially one in which the defendant seeks to recover 
1noney on a contract: narnely, a fire insurance policy, 
even though the appellant corporation initiated the pro-
ceedings seeking to have the policy declared void, and 
to recover, as on quaisi-contract, $2,000.00 already paid 
defendant as partial settlement on a fire loss. The plain-
tiff's defenses to the defendant's clain1 on the policy 
are (1) that l\[r. Thornpson never owned, or before the 
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renewal of the policy, he had parted with all interest 
in the insured building, and thenceforth had no insurable 
interest therein; and (2) that the policy \vas void by 
reason of defendant's rnisrepresentations as to owner-
ship and encumbrances. 
Issues were drawn on these affirn1ative defenses 
and tried to a jury which brought in a special verdict 
in favor of Mr. Thompson on all interrogatories pro-
pounded by the court. 
On the issue of insurable interest the appellant 
alleged that on Dece1nber 18, 1951, prior to the policy 
renewal and the loss Mr. Thon1pson had ''sold and con-
veyed" 'the insured building to one ~fr. Hardy. Mr. 
Thompson adn1itted that he had agreed to sell the build-
ing and that he had conveyed the land on which the un-
attached building was standing but denied that he had 
sold or transferred the building and asserted that he had 
possession and right of use plus an agreement with th~ 
executory buyer to protect and be responsible for the 
building until it shall be delivered. He denied the alleged 
misrepresentations. 
In paragraph 4 of his counterclailn upon the policy 
Mr. Thompson alleged that "the actual ctise value of 
the property so destroyed and .subject to the policy of 
insurance .aforesaid at the date of its destruction was: 
as to the insured bu.ilding $2,000 ....... " (R . .8). In 
its reply the appellant insurance con1pany formally 
pleaded that ".answering paragraph 4, plaintiff admits 
the i.nsu-red buildring was of the value of $2,000 ...... '' 
(R. 10). Thus no issue was raised as to the value of the 
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building for the purposes of settlernent of the policy 
obligation. Both parties tried the case upon the theory 
that appellant's only contention was that Mr. Thompson 
had no insurable interest in the building. It is true that 
son1e evidence "\vas presented with respect to the value 
of the building, but this was admissible and was sub-
Initted only on the issue of insurable interest, under 
\Vhich it was necessary that IV[r. Thompson show that 
he had a "'substantial econo1nic interest." It is obvious 
that the value of the building is material on whether 
or not Mr. Thou1pson's interest was a substantial econo-
lnic interest, and an objection to the evidence on the 
ground that it was -not "\vithin the issues could not pro-
perly have been sustained. 
On page 2 of appellant's brief it is asserted that 
'"it -vvas discovered" that the defendant had sold the 
fra1ne building prior to the date of the fire, which sale 
the co1npany had not been informed of at the time it 
paid l\Ir. Thompson $2,000 for the loss. This statement 
is not in accordance with the evidence or the finding of 
the jury. On the sa1ne page appellant states that it was 
further discovered that at the tirne the policy was ori-
ginally procured the defendant was not the owner of 
the building and had certain encurnbrances on other 
property of which he had not advised the co1npany. This 
~tate1nent also is contrary to the evidence and the find-
ing of the jury. 
On page 5 of appellant's brief it is said that "exa-
Inination of the application, Exhibit D-10, reveals that 
Leland Thompson was represented to be the owner of 
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the fra1ne dwelling, the tractor and the co1nbine," and 
that he did not own the f_r·ame dwelling at the tiu1e and 
that the tractor was n1ortaged to the Far1n Ho1ne Ad-
ministration which did not appear in the application 
for the policy. The i1nplication contained in the quoted 
clause is contrary to the evidence because Thompson did 
not fill out or co1nplete or sign the application. This 
was done entirely by Nick H. Topik, the agent for the 
insurance ·con1pany (T. 7-! and 76; 115-116). Moreover, 
Thompson told Topik about his contract with the Box 
Elder County Labor Association at the tirne he applied 
for the insurance (T 16). As will be hereinafter shown, 
Mr .. Thompson was at the very least the beneficial owner 
of the building at the ti1ne ; and he also told Topik about 
the loan on the tractor ( T 20). 
Again on pages 14 and 15 of its brief the appellant 
declares that Thon1pson conveyed his entire interest in 
the building to Mr. Hardy and that no consideration 
was paid for the privilege Thompson had to keep the 
possession and use of the building. The statement is 
further made that this right to the use of the building 
was revocable at any time by the owner. On page 15 
it is further said that the land "and the building itself" 
had been conveyed to Hardy and was completely within 
his possession and control. All of these statements are 
contrary to the evidence and to the findings of the jury. 
On page 24 of its brief the appellant says that the build-
ing is "admittably worth only $1,000." That is contrary 
to the admission of the parties and to the evidence of 
value which was adn1itted on another issue. On page 25 
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of its brief the appellant declares that Thompson was 
guilty of rnisrepresentations in at least four respects, 
(1) failure to reveal true ownership of the frame build-
ing and the encurnbrance on the tractor; (2) failure to 
notify the co1npany of the transfer of his interest in 
the building to IIardy; ( 3) 1nisrepresen tation of the 
value of the building in the proof of loss, and ( 4) that 
after the loss he misrepresented his interest in the build-
ing in the formal proof of loss by concealing the fact 
that he had sold the building. All of these statements 
are contrary to the evidence and the findings of the 
JUry: 
\Ve shall now attempt to summarize the evidence 
on these controverted points with references to the re-
eord. 
1Tirst, let us consider the transaction between 
Thompson and the Box Elder County F'arm Labor As-
t)Ociation by which he acquired the building in question. 
Tho1npson acquired the building under a written con-
tract, Exhibit D-4, ( T 35). By that contract, Exhibit 
D-4, the Association agreed to and in fact did move the 
building onto Thornpson's land for a consideration of 
$225.00 plus fixtures costing $20.00. Thompson leased 
to the Association a plot of ground suitable as a site. 
The Association permitted Thompson to prepare the 
building for occupancy and on that he spent a great 
deal of rnoney. The contract further provides that when 
the Association declares the labor housing emergency 
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at an end Tho1npson 1night ac(1uire the building per-
manently upon payment of $100.00 or actual cost, which-
ever is highest, and the Association would give "rhomp-
son a legal bill of sale. At the tin1e of the fire there was 
nothing left for Thompson to do before he got the bill 
of sale (T 36-37; 49). 
The building was not fastened in any way to the 
land owned by l\1r. Thon1pson and which was subse-
quently sold to Mr. Hardy. It was just set down and 
propped up on one end by cement blocks. There were 
no posts nor foundations, nor was there any excavating 
to adapt the land to the bnilding (T 34). At the time 
the policy vvas ordered l\fr. Topik was all around the 
building and "took a look" at it (T 34 and T 7'7). 
At the time the policy was ordered l\1r. Thompson 
told Topik about the contract with the Association and 
also told him that the Equitable Life and Causualty 
Company had a Inortgage on the land but no interest in 
the building, and Topik reported the mortgage on the 
land to appellant's ho1ne office ( T 16-17; T 66-68; Ex-
hibits D-10 and D-11). ·It is to be noted that Exhibit 
D-10 prepared by Topik apparently from information 
given him by Tho1npson, shows the real estate mortgage 
of $4,000.00 on the land. Although Topik apparently 
later advised the Company that the 1nortgage on the 
land had been paid off, l\Ir. Thompson never so advised 
him (T 116). As a matter of fact, sometime after the 
oriignal insurance policy was issued the defendant be-
came delinquent in his pay1nents on the real estate mort-
gage and was forced to sell the land to avoid foreclosure 
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(T 17 -18). Accordingly through a real estate agent he 
sold the fartn to l\Ir. Hardy. At the time the transaction 
\vith Hardy vvas negotiated Hardy was given an alter-
native offer: he could take the land either with or with-
out the building in question, and if he- took the building 
\Yith the land, the price on the package deal wa.s to he 
~~1,000.00 1nore than if he took the land without the build-
Ing. 
Hardy decided to take the building with the land 
at the increased price. However, at the time the trans-
action was negotiated Thompson explained to Hardy 
that he did not yet have a formal transfer of the- build-
ing (T 25). ~foreover, at the time the deal was made it 
was agreed between Tho1npson and Hardy that Thomp-
:-;on should reserve the possession and use of the build-
ing for the storage of his machinery until such time as 
he could get the Inachinery conveniently removed and 
for this he \Vas to n1ake it right with Hardy. At the 
tiine of the fire the contract between Thompson and 
Hardy for the sale of the building was still executory 
(T 26-28; 33-34; 141-143). In fact Thompson was still 
jn possession of the building and had never turned the 
keys over to Hard-:v at the time of the fire (T 34; 141). 
Hardy's boy wanted to move his machinery in there 
in the :B-,all before the fire, but Hardy told hi1n be could 
not move Thompson out and testified that even if he 
\Vanted to use the building, he would not have pulled 
Thompson's machinery out (T 146-147). 
~l_1he land i t~elf \vas deeded to Hardy on December 
18, 1951 (T 32; Exhibit P-3). 
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In the following SUllllner rrholnpson had not yet 
been able to dispose of his machinery and Tho1npson, 
feeling that he had perhaps withheld delivery of the 
building for a reasonable ti1ne, went to see Hardy about 
Thompson's continued use thereof. Under the circmn-
stances existing Hardy indicated he did not need the 
building and that it 'vas alright for 'Thompson to go 
on using it as he had. However, Hardy told Thompson 
that inasmuch as he was storing iinpleinents with gaso-
line in the building he felt that Thompson should protect 
and be responsible for the building during the time he 
possessed and used it, and thereupon Thompson agreed 
to protect and be responsible for the building while he 
used it (T 37~38; T 145). 
As a result of the loss after this agreement was 
made Thompson feels that he owes Hardy for the build-
ing, and I-Iardy expects Tho1npson either to pay foT it 
or replace it no matter what the result of this litigation 
1nay be (T 27; T 147-148). 
Some time in the late sun1mer or early fall of 1952 
the appellant's agent, Nick Topik, came to see Mr. 
Thompson about the renewal of the policy. He wanted 
Thompson to give him a check for the renewal and 
Thompson told him he intended to continue the insur-
ance but he was not able to pay him that day, and he 
then said to Topik, "I have sold the place but I still 
have my building there. I still have my machinery there 
and I am responsible for the building so I think I will 
still carry the insurance." Topik as agent of the com-
then advised Thon1pson as to the p-roper procedure. He 
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told Thon1pson to write a letter and advise the con1pany 
of what had been done and that if they wanted to issue 
a nevv policy, they would do so from headquarters. A 
little later Tho1npson followed the advice by writing the 
letter, Exhibit D-6, to the appellant at its Denver office 
(which \vas the office specified on the envelope sent 
with his pre1niu1n notice) and sent the letter, with his 
check for $19.60 for the pren1iu1n renewal and the pre-
1uiun1 notice or receipt, to the company through the re-
gular Inails. In that letter Thompson stated to the com-
pany, .. I have sold the fa.rm) bu.t I am still using the 
bttilding for storing 1ny nzachinery and thing,s until I 
can nzoue to Idaho) so everything is the sa.me. I am still 
r.es ponsible for the bttildi.ng until I move so I wish to 
keep the insurance on it. Will you please change the 
policy accordingly so I will still be protected." The 
check, Exhibit D-7, he received in his next monthly bank 
state1nent and in due course of n1ails he received in re-
turn fron1 the co1npany the renewal receipt, Exhibit D·-8 
('11 39-44). 
Mr. Jensen, Claims Manager for appellant corpora-
tion, testified that when the file on this policy was handed 
to him after the loss the letter was not contained there-
in. However, his testin1ony as to the system for opening 
1nail and filling letters in the company indicates that it 
is very loose indeed and that there is ample opportunity 
for such a letter to be misplaced or misfiled. It appears 
that an average of so1ne four hundred renewal letters 
are received each business day and opened by two clerks 
\vho then pull the files and pass the documents on to 
underwriters for consideration. In this process letters 
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commented, Hthat's all there is to it, isn't it'?'' (T 177). 
The appellant corporation excepted to son1e of the 
instructions (T 179-80) but no\Yhere proposed that the 
issue of the value of the building be sub1nitted to the 
jury. It should be observed that the exceptions taken to 
the court's instructions are not urged here. 
The question of insurable interest in the building 
at the ti1ne of obtaining the policy and at the time of the 
fire loss was subn1itted to the jury with an instruction 
that the phrase ''insurable interest" is defined as any 
lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety 
or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from 
loss, destruction or pecuniary damage. This is in the 
words of the Utah Statutory definition. 
Upon the court's instruction the jury returned a 
special verdict in answer to the interrogatories as fol-
lows: 
1. The defendant on September 18, 1951, had "sold 
but not conveyed" the building to Hardy. 
2. The fact of said sale or conveyance was not 
concealed fron1 and was not unknown to the plaintiff 
or its agent at the time of policy renewal. 
3. That the defendant did not misrepresent to the 
plaintiff that the tractor was free and clear of all en-
cumbrances at the ti1ne of applying for the original 
policy. 
4. That at the time of applying for the original 
policy the defendant did not misrepresent to the plaintiff 
12 
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or its agent that he o\vned the fran1e building in ques-
tion. 
5. That neither the plaintiff con1pany nor its agent 
relied upon the stateinents made by the defendant in the 
proof of loss in 1naking payrnent to the defendant of the 
sum of $2,000.00 on January 21, 1953. 
* * * * 
8. 11hat at the tin1e the defendant obtained the 
insurance policy he did not have an insurable interest 
in the building. 
9. That at the tiine of the fire the defendant did 
have an insurable interest in the building. 
The verdict was unanin1ous ( R 49-50). 
Interrogatories 6 and 7 dealt with the values of the 
1nachinery and are not relevant here. 
Appellant corporation never filed a motion for a 
ne\v trial. 
The conditional order i'or a new trial (R 73) and the 
order granting a new trial (R 76) were entered by the 
court on its own n1otion entirely without notice to de-
fendant and \vithout any opportunity to be heard as to 
the propriety thereof before said orders were entered 
(R 73; 76; 96-97). 
Within ten days after the entry of the conditional 
order and co-ternporaneously with the entry of the per-
einptory order for a new trial the respondent Mr. 
Thompson filed his \vri tten Inotion to amend the findings 
13 
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of the court by striking therefron1 the court's inter-
polated finding that the value of the building was $1,-
000.00 only and to vacate and set aside the conditional 
order and the further order for a ne\v trial. After ex-
tended argument, both \vritten and oral, these motions 
"\Vere granted and the judgn1ent originally entered on 
the verdict "\vas reinstated. This appeal followed. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. The defen.dant-reszJondent did have an 
insurable interest in the irn,su.red buildin .. (] a.t the tinte 
the policy was reneu;ed a.nd at the tin1e the loss occurred. 
POINT 2. The defendant-respondent properly u:as 
allowed to retain the $2,000.00 paid to him by appellant 
as_ the value of the building. 
POINT 3. The defendan.t-re.spondent 1nade no Jnis-
repr,esenta.tion, and the policy is valid. 
POINT 4. 11he court properly vacated its erron-
eous order for a new trial on pla.intiff' s com.plaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. The defendant-respondent did have an 
insurable interest in the insured bu.ilding at the tin1.e 
the p·olicy wa.s renewed a.nd at the time the loss occurred. 
At the outset it should be observed that the only 
question here raised by appellant with respect to Mr. 
Thompson's insurable interest is concerned with appel-
lant's clain1 that prior to the rene"\val of the policy and 
the loss of the building all of 1Ir. Thompson's interest 
therein had been transferred to Th1r. Hardy at the same 
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ti1ne the far1n \vas conveyed to him by deed. The theory 
is that he previously had an insurable interest but part-
ed with it at the tin1e he conveyed the real property. 
It would see1n to be a sufficient answer to this con-
tention that the question of this transfer (or "convey-
ance'' as it was styled by the court) to Hardy was sub-
rnitted to the jury under proper instructions which, as 
they are not here attacked, constitute the law of the 
case, and the jury specifically found that the building 
n·.(lS n.ot "conveyed" to Mr. Hardy when the real estate 
was conveyed. To n1ake assurance doubly sure the jury 
as the trier of the fact also specifically found that Mr. 
Thontpson did ha.ve an i.nsurable interest in the buildilng 
both at the tinte he obtained the policy and at the time 
of the fire (T 28). It is readily apparent from the record 
that these findings are a1nply supported by the evidence. 
It is very apparent that the building in question was 
not and never was intended to be a part of the real prop-
erty. It \vas never affixed to the land in any way. No 
foundations or posts or other installations were made 
which \vould indicate any intention that the building 
should be there permanently. The land was not exca-
vated in any way to accommodate it. When installed 
it was installed on land leased by the Labor Association 
from nfr. Thompson. At the time Mr. Thompson was 
forced to sell the land and was negotiating for the sale 
of the sa1ne he was still contemplating hauling the build-
ing off and it was treated strictly as a temporary build-
ing and his personal property. 
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Then \vhen l\Ir. Thon1pson \\·a~ forced to ~Pll his 
farm he debated \vhether or not he \vould sell the build-
ing when he sold the real e~tate and he ronsidered haul-
ing it away, but finally decided to give the purchaser 
the choice of buying the building \Vi th the farrn in a 
package deal, becan8e it \\Tould have cost him at least 
$1,000.00 to haul the building to Idaho and $500.00 to 
haul it to his other horne in Tre1nonton. Nevertheless, 
at the time Tho1npson's deal with Hardy was negotiated 
and in consideration of the 1nutual agreements made, 
including the i1n1nediate conveyance of the real property, 
it was agreed between th~ parties that Mr. Tho1npson 
should reserve to himself the building in question with 
the right to the use and occupation and the possession 
thereof until such tirne as he could conveniently move his 
machinery. The keys were not delivered and possession 
was not given of this personal property. Hardy testified 
that he never did get possession of the building. After 
so1ne time and because Hardy had not made a transfer 
of his title and possession of the building Mr. Thompson 
and Mr. Hardy further agreed that title, possession and 
right of use of the building should continue to be re-
served, but that in view of some delay Mr. Thompson 
should protect and be responsible for the building, ob-
viously so that he could either make delivery or pay the 
value of the same "\Vhen the time caine ·to execute the 
executory contract of sale. 
Another 1notivating factor in Tho1npson's reserva-
tion of this building was his feeling as a layman that all 
of the technical formalities incident to his transaction 
with the Labor Association should be completed before 
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he delivered a bill of sale. But whatever the motivating 
factor, it is clear that the parties intended merely an 
executory contract to sell this building to Mr. Hardy as 
personal property at such time as he could move his ma-
chinery out of the building. This was the status at the 
time of the fire loss. 
Respondent is not quite clear just wherein appellant 
contends ~1r. Tho1npson's rights in the premises fails to 
1neet the statutory definition of an insurable interest as 
t;et out in Section 31-19-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
\Vherein it is said that the phrase means "any lawful and 
substantial econo1nic interest in the safety or preserva-
tion of the subjeet of the insurance free from loss, de-
struction or pecuniary damage." Even if the jury had 
not found that Thompson had not "conveyed" the build-
ing to Hardy, nevertheless it is clear that Thompson 
had a legal obligation to Hardy to deliver the possession 
of the building when he was through with it, and for 
his failure to perforin this obligation he would be liable 
to Hardy for the full value of the building for breach of 
his contract to deliver the same pursuant to the contract 
to sell. ~foreover, he had the use and possession thereof 
for his own benefit and an agreement to protect and be 
responsible for it to Hardy. 
Under the uncontroverted facts, therefore, Thomp-
son had an insurable interest under any one of the fol-
lowing theories : 
1. He was the owner of the building subject only 
to a contract to sell and deliver the same. 
17 
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2. He ''Tas a bailee of the building having the right 
to the beneficial use thereof at the ti1ne of the loss. 
3. He \Vas a bailee of the building obligated by eon-
tract to protect and be responsible for the sa1ne. 
4. As a seller who had not delivered, he had a sub-
stantial econo1nic interest in the safety and preservation 
of the building because its loss would leave him liable to 
Hardy for the value thereof. 
The Utah statutory definition of "insurable inter-
est" is merely declaratory of the common law, as ap-
pears from the following te:Xt quoted from 44 CJS IN-
SURANCE, Section 175b: 
''In general a person has an insurable inter-
est in the subject matter insured where he has 
such a relation or connection with, or concern in, 
such subject matter that he will derive pecuniary 
benefit or advantage from its preservation, or 
will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its 
destruction, termination, or injury by the happen-
ing of the event insured against. 
"Great liberality is indulged in determining 
whether a p·erson has anything at hazard in the 
subject rna tter of the insurance, and any interest 
which would be recognized by a court of law or 
equity is an insurable interest. Thus, the inter-
est of insured may be personal or as a repre-
sentative of the rights of others; and while 
neither legal nor equitable title is necessary, a 
person must have such a right or interest as the 
law will recognize and protect. Different persons 
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" 'Particular Interests.' Persons held to 
have an insurable interest in property include 
persons having the custody of, and responsibility 
for, the property, such as bailees, * * * Whether 
or not a vendor has an insurable interest depends 
on whether he has made an absolute t,ransfer or 
has retained a lien on some rights or liabilitir3is in 
respect to the property." 
(I ta.lics provided.) 
In this case, it is clear that the jury was correct in 
finding that Mr. Thompson retained an insurable inter-
est as a vendor because he had not made an absolute 
transfer but had retained the right to the beneficial use 
of the building and had made himself liable for its pro-
tection and for the delivery thereof at the end of the 
period of his use. 
Again in 44 CJS INSURANCE, Section 183, it is 
said that: 
"Any bailee or person having custody of 
property and responsible for it may take fire in-
surance in his own na1ne for the benefit of him-
self and the bailor, and may recover not only a 
sum equal to his own interest in the property by 
reason of any lien for advances or charges, but 
the full amount named in the policy up to the 
value of the property;" 
(Italics supplied.) 
Again it is said that one having the care, custody or 
possession of property for another even without liability 
and without any pecuniary interest therein may, never-
theless, obtain insurance on such property for the benefit 
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of the owner and the insurance \vill so inure on the sub-
sequent adoption of the insurance even after the hap-
pening of a loss. See 
44 CJS. IN.SURANCE, Section 185, 
Notes 20 and 21. 
However, in this case, it is not necessary to go so far 
in order to support a judgment for the defendant, for in 
our case, the jury was clearly justified in finding that 
Mr. Thompson had an insurable interest in his own right 
by reason of being the owner subject only to an execu-
tory contract to sell, or that he was in possession and en-
titled to the beneficial use thereof or that he was in pos-
session and legally obligated to account for the building 
or the value thereof to Mr. Hardy. In this connection, 
see 
44 CJ'S INSURANCE, Section 180, 
reading in part as follows: 
"Any title to, or interest in, property, 
whether legal or equitable, and however slight 
or uncertain in duration, will support a contract 
of fire insurance on the property. The term 'in-
terest', as used in the phrase 'insurable interest', 
is not limited to property or ownership in the sub-
ject matter of the in.sur·ance; where the interest 
of insured in, or his relation to, the property is 
such that he will, or may, be benefited by its con-
tinued existence or suffer a direct pecuniary loss 
from its destruction or injury by fire, his contract 
of insurance will be upheld, although he has no 
title, either legal or equitable, no property right 
or interest, no estate, no lien, and no possession 
or right of possession. Thus an insurable interest 
in property may arise from some liability which 
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insured incurs with relation thereto, although he 
is not in possesion of the property, and has no 
interest therein beyond the danger of pecuniary 
damage from the loss of the property hy reason 
of such assu1ned liability. Such liability may 
arise by force of statute or by contract, or may be 
fixed by law from the obligations which insured 
assumes * * * The principle, stated supra 223, 
that insurance is a personal contract, does not im-
ply that, in order to recover, insured must have a 
personal interest * * * 
* * * ''The fact that an owner of property 
may be able to reirnburse himself from other 
sources in case of its destruction is no reason for 
denying to him an insurable interest in the prop-
erty." 
Even an insurance carrier, without any vestige of 
title or right in the building, has an insurable interest 
and may reinsure the same, because it is "responsible" 
for a loss thereof. 
The adjudicated principles applicable to this case 
as above quoted fron1 Corpus Juris Secundum have been 
very recently considered in the modern and authoritative 
insurance text, Appleman: Insurance Law and Practice. 
In the hope that it will be of some assistance to the 
Court we will quote briefly this text writer's statements 
of the princi pies under consideration. 
4 Appleman: Insurance Law & Practice, 
~2123: 
"The usual rule customarily followed is that 
an insurable interest exists when the insured de-
rive pecuniary benefit or advantage by the pres-
ervation or continued existence of the property 
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or will sustain pecuniary loss from its destruc-
tion. Reasonable expectation of benefit from 
preservation of property is thus sufficient; or 
liability to loss from damage to it 'viii be suffi-
cient. 
"A right of property is not an essential in-
gredient of insurable interest; any limited or 
qualified interest, whether legal or equitable, or 
any expectancy of advantage is sufficient." 
4 Appleman: Insurance Law & Practice, 
§2181: -
"Both the vendors and purchasers of prop-
erty have an insurable interest therein * * *" 
"The vendor retains an insurable interest in 
the property under many circumstances. If, of 
course, he has parted with no possession, there is 
little question on this point. The same is true 
where the s'eller * * * has reserved title, or pos-
session, or has not yet made conveyance to the 
vendee." 
4 Appleman: Insurance Law & Practice, 
§2211: 
"Bailed property is generally regarded as 
held in trust in the view of insurance law. In 
this sense, the expression' trust' is treated as pos-
session of property of others for which the as-
sured ean be called to account. For this reason 
any person in custody of property and responsi-
ble for it, may take insurance in his own name, 
and in the event of a loss may recover the full 
value of the amount named in the policy up to the 
value of the property. 
"A bailee is generally stated to have an in-
surable interest which he n1ay insure for himself 
and the bailor. He may also insure such goods 
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up to the full value thereof, holding the remain-
der, after deducting his own loss, as a trustee for 
the bailor." 
These principles have been settled in the law of 
insurance for a long time and the only modification dis-
cernable in the latter cases are an increasing tendency 
to allow the widest latitude in the definition of an insur-
able interest in order to hold valid the policy in recogni-
tion of the very complicated property and contractual 
Interests to which modern civilization and modern com-
merce and industry have given rise. One of the best 
discussions and reviews of leading cases defining insur-
able interests is to be found in the Michigan case of 
Cross1nan v. American Insurance Company 
of Newark, 164 Northwestern 428, LRA 
1918A, 390. 
We believe a careful reading of that case will be of great 
assistance to the Court. 
Again in the case of 
it is said: 
Ferguson v. Pekin Plo\v Company (Missouri 
1897) 42 Southwestern 711, 
''Nothing is better settled than that agents, 
wharfingers, warehouse1nan, commission mer-
chants and others having the custody of and beilng 
resp~onsible for property of their principals or 
consignors, may insure such property in their 
own names, and may in their own names recover, 
not merely to the amount of their commissions 
or charges on such property, but the full amount 
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It will be re1nembered that the evidence before the 
jury for consideration in determining whether or not 
Mr. Thompson had an insurable interest in the building 
in question was to the effect that although Mr. Thomp-
son had made a de-al to sell the building to Mr. Hardy, 
~e had made an arrangement with Mr. Hardy that he 
would have for an indefinite period the beneficial use 
and occupation of the building upon the specific under-
standing and agre-ement that Mr. Thomp~son would be 
responsible for and would protect the building. Even if 
the Court should be of the opinion that as a matter of 
law the property in the building had .passed to Mr. 
Hardy, nevertheless, Mr. Thompson had retained a bene-
ficial· interest and entered into a contractual obligation 
to be responsible for the building, and under the author-
ities refe-rred to was entitled to insure the same for the 
full amount even though between himself and Mr. Hardy 
he might hold part of the proceeds as trustee for Mr. 
Hardy. 
The ease of 
Bird v. Central ~Ianagers Mutual Insurance 
Company (Oregon) 120 Pac. 2nd 753, 
is in point. There a corporation's sales manager merely 
borrowed the corporation's automobile and agreed that 
he would be personally responsible or liable for the 
damages thereto. The Oregon Court held that the sales 
rnanager who had thus borrowed the car had an insur-
able interest therein and could recover from the insur-
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See also the case of 
Aktiebologet M. Bank v. Hanover Fire In-
surance Cornpany, 208 New York Supple-
ment 173 (later reversed on other grounds) 
where it was held that one giving a covenant of indem-
nity to a bonding cornpany which was issuing a bond to 
secure release of a ship frorn a writ of attachment had 
an insurable interest in the attached property even 
though he had no title whatsoever thereto, because he 
was bound to n1ake a payment to the bonding company 
if the property was destroyed so that it could not be 
returned into the attaching officer's custody if the at .. 
tachment was held valid. 
See also the case of 
Dublin Paper Company v. Insurance Com-
pany of North America, 63 Atlantic 2nd 
85, 8 ALR 2nd 1393. 
There certain policies of fire insurance were issued 
in such form as not to be affected by the making of a 
contract to sell the insured property and were also so 
drawn as not to cover the interest of the vendee. After 
the issuance of these policies the insured made a con-
tract to sell the property. Shortly after this contract 
of sale was made a rider was issued for the policy in-
creasing the arnount of the insurance. Thereafter the 
property was destroyed by fire, but before the loss had 
been paid the insured received payment of the purchase 
money from his vendee so that he had in fact received 
his full purchase price and so far as he was concerned 
had got out of the property the arnount he had contracted 
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to sell it for. The Court held that the insurance was on 
the property and not upon the paynt ent of the balanoe 
of the purchase price, and accordingly the insurer was 
not relieved of liability by the making of the contract of 
sale and the payment of the purchase price, but the in-
surance company must pay the loss to the insured who 
would hold the ainount as trustee for the vendee. It is 
to be noted that the statement that an insurance p·olicy 
is personal is not to be eonstrued to defeat an insurance 
policy on property under circumstances such as those 
in the case mentioned. It is submitted that this ease is 
exactly in point and in favor of Mr. Thompson's position. 
In the case of 
Waring v. The Indemnity Fire Insurance 
Company (New York 1871) 45 New York 
606, 6 Am. R. 146, 
the plaintiff sold oil to various vendees, and received the 
purchase price in full. The oil was stored in a ware-
house and complete delivery made by delivery of ware-
house certificates, etc., but the place of storage had not 
been changed. The plaintiff seller insured the oil "sold 
but not removed" in his own name. It was destroyed by 
fire, and the defendant insurance company refused to 
pay on the policy upon the ground that the seller who 
had parted with title and received the p·urehase price 
had no insurable interest. The New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the plaintiff as agent or occupant could 
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"The right is put upon the fact that, having 
possession of the property exclusive as to all 
but the owner, to whom they are responsible, they 
have the right to protect the loss, so that it or 
its value Inay be rendered to the owner when he 
calls for his own." 
rrhis case is obviously exactly in point and indeed goes 
even farther than it is necessary to go here in order to 
affirm the judgment of the Court below. 
An extensive annotation on the subject of insurable 
interest is set out in 
8 ALR 2nd, Page 1408, and following. 
It appears that the cases there digested which are in 
point uniformly support Mr. Thompson's position. 
Again in the case of 
Millville Aerie No. 1836 F:O.E. v. Weather-
hie, (New Jersey Equity), 88 Atl. 847, 
it was held -that where a vendor obtains insurance on 
property in his own na1ne, notifying the insurance com-
pany of the sale contract, and the property is destroyed, 
he may recover from tbe insurance company on the 
policy, even though he holds the insurance proceeds as 
trustee for the vendee as between the vendor and the 
vendee. 
Finally the case of 
Rice Oil Company v. Atlas Assurance Com-
pany, 102 Federal 2nd 561, 
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and based on the law of Montana, is in point and 
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in favor of l\Ir. Thompson. There an oil con1pany sold 
certain property but reserved possession and use of cer-
tain buildings and equipment constituting personal prop-
erty located on the land until full payment of the pur-
chase price was made by the extraction of oil from the 
land or until operation of the real property ceased to be 
profitable. A fire occurred and the buildings and equip-
ment were destroyed and the vendor eornpany sued on 
the insurance policies which it had procured on the per-
sonal property. The court commented that under the 
contract the seller had agreed to deliver the insured 
property to the buyer at the end of the term for which 
it had reserved the beneficial use and that it might be 
liable to the buyer for the value of the property. It helq 
that there was a bailment of the pToperty which was in 
effect held in trust within the purview of insurance law 
and that it had a duty to exercise ordinary care for its 
preservation which would give rise to a liability to the 
buyer if this duty was not discharged and that this duty 
required the i.nsuring of the property. The court accord-
ingly held that the insured in this case had such a rela-
tionship to the property that it would be benefitted by· 
its continued existence a.nd that it would suffer a direct 
pecuniary injury by its loss and that it had an insurable 
interest therein even though it had no legal or equitable 
title. The court's discussion of the pToblem will, we are 
sure, be very helpful to this court in its consideration 
of the pr·oblem in the case at Bar. The case is in point 
and supports Mr. Thompson's position. 
Under the evidence, under the findings of the jury 
and under the law Mr. Thompson at all relevant times 
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had an insurable interest in the building authorizing 
hi1n to insure the same and to collect insurance up to the 
full value of the building. The findings and judgment 
are correct and should be affirmed. 
POINT 2. The defendant-respondent properly was al-
lowed to retain the $2,000.00 p,a,id to hin~ by appellant 
as the valu.e of the building. · 
In the second section of its argument the appellant 
n1akes the obvious point that the lilnit of Mr. Thompson's 
recovery on the policy is the actual cash value of the 
frame building at the time of loss. This is in accord 
with the policy and no issue exists between the parties 
as to that bald statement. However, appellant then il-
logically and without any basis in fact or law proceeds 
to a conclusion that ~Ir. Thompson should refund to ap-
pellant $1,000.00 out of the $2,000.00 voluntarily paid to 
hin1 by the company as settlement for his loss of the 
building. Ilere the parties again part company. 
Appellant declares, and we agree, that Mr. Thomp-
son is entitled to the actual cash value, and then appel-
lant in its reply, formally ad1nits that the actual cash 
value of the building was $2,000.00. As we have shown, 
the issue of the cash value of the building and the 
amount of the recovery was not tendered or tried in 
this case. As the records sho\v, the appellant all through 
the trial of the case reiterated that the only issue was 
the insurable interest of ~1r. Thompson. Even after the 
court and counsel had carefully and after extended con-
ferences \Vorked out the issues of fact to be submitted 
to the jury, and had reduced thein to the interrogatories 
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which were later propounded, the appellant declared that 
so far as the counterclai1n \\Tas concerned the issues of 
value of the destroyed ntachi·Jlery constituted ''all there 
was to it." 
Appellant quotes Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to the effect that when issues not raised 
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent 
of the parties they shall be treated as if they were raised 
by the pleadings, and seeks thereby to interject the cash 
value of the building into the issues when that had been 
formally removed by a forrnal admission that the value 
was $2,000.00. 
We respectfully subn1it that there is no express or 
implied consent to try this issue to be found anywhere 
in the record. True, as we pointed out in our Statement 
of F·acts, some evidence as to value was presented, but 
this was properly presented and received upon the issue 
of "insurable interest," to show that the economic inter-
est of 1fr. Thon1pson was a "substantial" one, as re-
quired by the Statute defining the phrase ''insurable in-
terest." For an economic interest to be "substantial," 
the interest 111ust have some value which is economic, 
and an expression of that value in terms of dollars as 
well as in terms of utility is a proper \vay to show that 
the interest is "substantial," and that the building in fact 
\Vas an asset, and not just a shack constituting a. liability 
to which no substantial economic interest could attach. 
Moreover, just as soon as the trial court, inadver-
tently overlooking the formal adrnission of value, drafted 
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the court's finding of value upon the finding of the jury 
on the other issues vvhich were tried, Mr. Thompson 
prornptly n1oved to arnend the findings by striking the 
court's finding therefrom as being beyond the issues of 
fact tried ( R 77-78, I->aragra ph 2). Appellant in its brief 
cites authority to the effect that a party impliedly con-
sents to the in troducion of issues not raised in the plead-
ings by failure to object to the admission of evidence 
relating thereto. However, an exarnination of the cases 
cited in support of the text quoted discloses that in all 
of those cases the evidence admitted without objection 
\\'as not adrnissible on any other issue which was already 
present in the case. Here, as we have pointed out, the 
evidence in question \vas admissible on another issue, 
so that no implied consent could arise either from the 
failure to object to this evidence or from the presenta-
tion of such evidence as bearing on the other issue which 
\vas set up by the pleadings and tried. 
There \Vas no in1plied consent to try the issue of the 
~rnount of recovery for the loss of the building. Issues 
should not be broadened to cover facts formally admitted 
on any such equivocal record as the one here presented 
by the appellant. To do so would only create great con-
fusion. 
I-Iowever, even if the (;ourt were to decide that the 
i_ssue had been tried by the irnplied consent of the par-
ties and that it was proper for the trial court to make a 
fjnding thereon, still the finding which the trial court 
first drafted into the .jury's verdict, and then later struck 
therefrorn, is not supported by the evidence. The only 
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evidence on \vhich the court could base a finding of a 
value of the building in the sum of $1,000 was the fact 
that in the package deal between ~lr. Hardy and l\1r. 
'l~hompson $1,000 was allovved for the building. Howr-
ever, it must he remernbered that under the uncontro-
-verted evidence this was not relevant, rnaterial or corn-
petent evidence on the issue of the market value of the 
building for the reason that the sale was one in which 
Mr. ThompBon wa,s forced to sell a.gainst his will to avoid 
a foreclosure, and v.ras not a transaction between a will-
jng buyer and a willing seller, neither of whom was com-
veiled to make a transaction. The transaction is not one 
which is relevant to the fair cash or market value of the 
building in question under all of the established rules. 
See 
and 
State, ex rel ~fcKelvey v. Styner, (Idaho) 
72 Pac. 2nd 699; 
Kansas City and G. Railway Company v. 
Haake (Missouri) 53 Southwestern 2nd 
891, 84 ALR 1477 ; 
Richer v. Burke (Oregon) 34 Pac. 2nd 317; 
Pittsburgh, etc. Railway Con1pany v. Gage 
(Illinois) 121 Northeastern 582; 
Coos Bay Logging Company v. Barclay 
(Oregon) 79 Pac. 2nd 672. 
On the other hand all of the relevant evidence which 
1night be considered in determining the value of the 
property is to the effect that the building was reason-
ably worth rnore than $2,000. 
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~lr. Gatfield, the experienced claims adjuster for 
the appellant hirnself determined that the value was in 
excess of the insurance coverage of $2,000. The esti-
Inates of a carpenter were to the effect that it would 
take n1ore than $2,500 to replace the building and the 
owner \vas of the opinion that it was of substantial eco-
nomic value, to-wit, so1newhere around $3,000, even 
though at forced sale he was willing to sell it for less 
to avoid the expense of n1oving it away and to get his 
rnoney so that he could a void a deficiency judgment in a 
foreclosure sale. 
It is apparent frorn the entire record that the ap-
pellant considered the issue of fair cash value closed 
by the pleadings until after the court, through inadvert-
ence and rnistake, drafted a finding onto the jury's ver ... 
diet. Then the appellant immediately and gratefully 
accepted the trial court's error as 1nanna fro1n heaven and 
thence hitherto has pursued the matter. 
But the fact is that the issue was settled by the 
pleadings and there is no evidence to justify any differ-
ent finding even if the matter were to be opened for 
testimony. The judgment should be affirmed as against 
this attack. 
There i~ another and additional reason why Mr. 
Thon1pson properly \vas allowed to retain the $2,000 paid 
to hi1n as the value of the building. The court will recall 
from the Statement of F-,acts that this figure was arrived 
at by the appellant's adjuster, Mr. Gatfield, before any-
one eonsulted with l\Ir. ~rhompson about the value of the 
ouilding, and the company's representatives made out 
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the check and sent it to and deliYered it to 1\Ir. Tho1npson 
'vithout any question 'vhatsoever. Obviously this pay-
ment was n1ade voluntarily and if there was any IBis-
understanding on the part of the appellant the misunder-
standing was the result of its own negligence or inat-
tention. L'"nder these circumstances this voluntary pay-
ment cannot be recovered. 
Slack v. National Bank of Co1nmerce, 9 Utah 
193, 30 Pac. 7 46; 
Richey v. Clarke, 11 Utah 467, 40 Pac. 717. 
Apparently the court, at the tin1e it inadvertently 
1nade the finding of $1,000 in value, considered that Mr. 
Thompson's econo1nic interest in the building at the tune 
of the loss was only the am·ount of the consideration paid 
on contract to sell so1ne eleven months before. However, 
this was not the fact. As has been shown by the author-
ities cited under the previous section, Mr. Thompson was 
entitled to insure and eollect insurance on the entire 
cash value of the building even though he had in fact 
been paid. He must still settle with Mr. Hardy for his 
failure to deliver the building under their agreement, and 
the indications are that Mr. Thompson may well have 
to pay Mr. Hardy in excess of $2,000 when he settles with 
him, as Mr. Hardy under the Sales Act is entitled not 
to his 1noney back, but to the value of his bargain, which 
under the evidence may be as high as $3,000. 
I 
After further and 1nature consideration the trial 
court very properly allowed Mr. Thompson to retain the 
full $2,000 paid him by the appellant. 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l~OINT 3. The defendant-respondent m.ade no ntis-
repr,esen.ta.tion, a·nd the policy is valid. 
Appellant contends that the policy was void because 
of certain Inisrepresentations listed by appellant on page 
25 of its brief. 
r~ehis is esentially the defense of fraud. It is well es-
tablished that one asserting that the making of a con-
tract, particularly a \Vritten contract, was induced by 
fraud n1ust establish such fact by clear and convincing 
evidence, and that if the evidence is not clear and con-
VIncing, a 1nere preponderance of the evidence is not 
sufficient. 
17 CJS CONTRACTS, Section 605, Pages 
1257-8; 
Hanson v. ~[utual Finance Corporation, 84 
Utah 579, 37 Pac. 2nd 784; 
Wiley v. First National Bank, 257 North-
western 214. 
vVhere such a defense is interposed to an insurance 
contract the rule formerly was in Utah that every ele-
ment of fraud, including the element of intent to deceive 
and defraud, Inust be proved by the person asserting 
~uch fraud, on \\'honl the burden of proof as above out-
lined rests. 
New York Life Insurance Company v. Gro\v, 
103 Utah 285, 135 Pac. 2nd 120. 
However, in 19+7, that rule \Vas Inodified by statute. 
Section 31-19-8, [Jtah Code Annot.at.ed 1953, in effect pro-
vides that \Vhere 1nisrepresentation has been shown, the 
burden shifts to the insul'P(l to ~how that the misrepre-
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sentation "~as not 1nade 'vith intent to deceive. Ho,vever, 
the burden is still upon the plaintiff in this ea~e to sho"T' 
by clear an.d convincing evidence, that the Inisrepre-
sentations alleged "\vere in fact n1ade and that they were 
n1a terial and that they vvere in fact relied on. 
l\Ioreover, Section 31-19-8, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, specifically provides that no oral or written Inis-
representation or warranty 1nade in the negotiation of an 
insurance con tract by the insured or in his behalf shall 
be deemed material "or defeat or avoid the contract or 
prevent it attaching," unless such misrepresentation 
is made with the intent to deceive. 
The question of the making of misrep-resentation 
as alleged by the plaintiff was tried to the jury and 
submitted to it by the court. Similarly the question a.s to 
whether or not the appellant here relied upon the state-
Inents made by 1\fr. Thompson in the proof of loss in 
making payment to Mr. Thompson of the sum of $2,000 
was tried to and sub1nitted to the jury by the court. 
The jury its special verdict found as a matter of fact 
that no misrepresentations were made as to the owner-
ship of the building or as to the encumbrances on the 
tractor and this verdict is supported by the evidence as 
has been shown. Far fron1 establishing n1isrep-resenta-
tion by clear and convincing evidence the plaintiff failed 
to establish it by even a preponderance of the evidence. 
The jury further found that the fact of the sale of the 
building was not concealed from or unknown to the plain-
tiff, and this is in accordance with the evidence that Mr. 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thon1pson reported that sale in writing received at the 
appellant's Denver Office and apparently lost by appel-
lant there. 
Appellant relies upon a provision in the policy to 
the effect that the policy should be void if the illdUred 
•'-wilfully" conceals or 1nisrepresents any material fact 
or circtunstance. This clause is directly contrary to the 
provisions of the statute last quoted and cannot be given 
any force or effect. But if it were to be given effect, still 
it will not avail the appellant, for there is absolutely no 
evidence of any ~',villful" concealment or misrepresenta-
tion. The only incorrect statement ever made by Mr. 
Tho1npson to the company was certainly not material. 
It is contained in the Proof of Loss prepared by appel-
lant and signed by Thompson without reading. It re-
ported a rnortgage on the building to the Davis County 
Bank, \vhen in fact there was no mortgage. The state-
ntent as to the value of the building is modest and cor-
rect, and even if it were not, it was induced by the appel-
lant's adjuster who arrived at his own value and sub-
Initted the proof of clain1 according to ail of the evidence. 
The most that can be said is that Thompson agreed with 
the appellant's 1·epresentatives as to the value. And, as 
has been said, the jury found on competent evidence that 
the cornpany did not in any way rely on this representa-
tion in rnaking settlement. It relied upon the findings 
of its own adjuster. 1\Ioreover, under the evidence it 
could not be said that a representation of value at $2,000 
was a willful misrepresentation. 
~fr. 'l1hornpson has acted honestly and justly 
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throughout the transaction. lie spent 1noney for insur-
ance and he is entitled to the proeeeds. The policy is not 
void for any n1isrepresentation \\Tillful or otherwise. 
POINT 4. The cozert properly caca.ted its erron-
eous order for a new trial on plaintiff's co1nplaiu.t. 
FToln \Yhat has been said heretofore, it is now ver~' 
apparent that the trial eourt erred in ordering a new 
trial unless l\fr. Tho1npson should ren1it $1,000 out of the 
$2,000.00 paid hiin in settlement of the insurance on the 
building. The jury had found that the pay1nent was not 
obtained by any 1nisrepresentation,, it is apparent that 
the payment was voluntarily n1ade, and the court in-
advertently and by lnistake lllade a finding as to the 
value of the building when that was not an issue before 
the court. Appellant Inade no m·otion for a new trial but 
seeks now to profit by perpetuating the error of the trial 
court which the trial court itself in its discretion cor-
rected. 
The court itself found that the finding of fact in-
serted by the court was Inade and the orders for new 
trial based thereon entered inadvertently under the er-
roneous impression that there was an issue of fact to be 
determined as to the value of the frame structure in 
question, and that the court did not have in mind the 
fact that the parties by their pleadings had stipulated 
to the value of the structure (R 113). 
The original orders of the Court granting a new 
trial were erroneous even if there had been an issue to 
be tried on the value of the building. There was no rea-
son to subject Mr. Thompson and the State to the ex-
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pense and trouble of a re-trial on all issues merely be-
cause one issue had been omitted. Even if the orders 
had been otherwise correct, they should have limited the 
new trial 1to the trial of the sole issue of the. value lof 
the building, which was the only matter then left un-
deternlined or in doubt so far as the jury or the trial 
court \vas concerned. Ho\vever, as we have seen, the 
orders \¥ere inadvertently entered under a misappre-
hension as to the state of the pleadings, and within ten 
day after their entry and the entry of the court's finding 
as to value which was grafted onto the verdict of the 
jury, 1Ir. Thompson 1noved to strike the court's find-
ing fro1n the verdict of the jury and to vacate the orders 
for a new trial (R 77-79). At the same time and in the 
alternative ~Ir. Thon1pson 1noved for an order to limit 
the new trial to the question of value, but that of course 
is 1noot now. Upon reviewing the whole thing and con-
sidering extensive written arguments the trial court con-
cluded that it was in error and itself corrected the error 
and reinstated the judgtnent and vacated the orders for 
a new trial. 
Perhaps it should also be observed that respondent's 
motions were filed within ten days after the filing of 
the findings of fact and judg1nent. 
Now appellant contends that the trial court, having 
1nade an inadvertent error, had no jurisdiction to cor-
rect it and assigns error to the order of the court cor-
recting its inadvertent error. Appellant in support of 
that strange position cites authority to the effect that 
when a motion for a new trial has been den.i.ed and the 
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ten day period allo,ved by ~tatute or rule for the 1naking 
of the 1notion has elapsed, the court's jurisdietion hn~ 
ter1ninated and it cannot thereafter grant a new trial. 
Appellant then baldly and 'vithout justification con-
cludes that, if after the court has denied a new trial 
and the tin1e for filing a 1notion has lapsed the court 
cannot then grant a new trial, the converse is also true, 
and that where the court has granted a new trial and 
retained the jurisdiction of the cause thereby it cannot 
thereafter exercise the retained jurisdiction to vacate the 
order granting a new trial and reinstate the original 
judgn1ent. The authorities relied on by the appellant 
here are based on facts which are the exact opposite of 
the facts existing in the case at bar. 
The appellant also con tends that there is no author-
ity in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which would 
authorize the court to vacate the orders for a new trial 
in question. Let us consider this pr,oposition first. As 
we have shown, the orders for a new trial and the finding 
of the court were entered in the absence of Mr. Thomp-
son and his counsel and without any notice or oppor-
tunity to be heard. Under these circumstances, the Rules 
specifically provide that the order may be vacated with 
or without notice. Rule 7 (b) (2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure declares that: BExcept as otherwise spe-
cifically provided by these. Rules, any order made with-
out notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modi-
fied without notice by the judge who made it, or may be 
vacated or modified on notice." 
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rrhere is no specific prohibition in the Rules against 
the vacating of an order for a new trial made without 
notice or opportunity for hearing and in the absence of 
the party against who1n the order was made. This Rule 
therefore specifically grants to the trial court the dis-
cretionary power which the court exercised and it should 
not be disturbed by this court. 
The motion of l\Ir. Thon1pson to amend the findings 
\Vas n1ade 'vithin ten days after entry of the judgment 
and pursuant to Rule 59 (b) providing that "upon mo-
tion of a party made not later than ten days after entry 
of judg1nent the court n1ay arnend its findings, or make 
additional findings and rnay amend the judgment accord-
ingly." I-Iere again the court has specific authority and 
jurisdiction granted to it to an1end the finding which it 
inadvertently and erroneously grafted onto the verdict, 
and having a1nended the findings by striking the im-
proper declaration of fact on a settled issue, the very 
basis for the new trial failed and it would be idle to go 
through the 1notions of a new trial upon issues that have 
been settled fron1 the beginning. 
In its argument that the court had lost jurisdiction 
to do anything except retry the case by reason of having 
entered its erroneous orders for a new trial the appellant 
cites and relies upon the Utah case of 
Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac. 1023, 
which held that an application for a rehearing of an 
order of the trial court denying a motion for a new trial 
does not affect the running of the time for taking ap-
peals, which begins to run when the order denying the 
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motion for a new trial is entered. It is true that the Su-
prenle Court in its decision in that case used s.on1e gen-
eral language con1n1enting that in California it iH estab-
lished that the trial court ha8 no po\ver to reopen the 
question of granting or denying an order for a nev¥ trial 
after disposing of it. However, reference to the cases 
cited indicates that all of those cases were, like the Luke 
case, cases where the 1notion for ne\v trial had been de-
nied so that the original judgntent was 1nade final and 
the jurisdiction of the trial court finally ter1ninated 
and exhausted, and there was nothing n1ore re1naining 
in the case upon \vhich the trial court could exercise its 
jurisdiction. 
An entirely different question is. presented where, 
as here, a new trial has been granted. By the granting of 
a new trial the court has acted to retain jurisdiction over 
the case by an order which is interlocutory rather than 
final in its character. The case instead of becoming dead 
reverts to the trial calendar, and while there the court, 
of course, has jurisdiction of all asp·ects of the case and 
can entertain any Inotions 1nade with respect thereto. 
Accordingly it is the general rule that an order 
granting a new trial n1ay be reconsidered, modified or 
vacated by the court at any time and the court has full 
and plenary power to act in the premises. The Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts only a few years ago had occa-
sion to pass upon this precise question in the case of 
DeLuca v. Boston Elevated Railway Com-
pany, 45 NE 2d 463, 
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in which a 1notion for a new trial was first granted and 
then, on motion by the opposite party, vacated. The 
Court says: 
"There was no error in vacating the order 
allowing the motion for a new trial. This order 
recites that the 1notion for a new trial had been 
'allowed by 1nistake,' but the nature of the 'mis-
take' does not appear. This, however, is im-
Inaterial. Obviously there had been no entry of 
final judg1nent. Before the entry of such a judg-
ment it was vvithin the power of the trial judge 
to n1ake the records of the court conform to the 
facts by striking therefroin an order that did not 
confor1n to the decision intended by him to be 
Inade, or, even if the order entered did so con-
forn1, it was vvithin the power of the trial judge 
to reconsider his decision and, if he concluded 
that it was erroneous, to correct the error. And 
he could correct a mistake or error of either kind 
without further hearing or notice to the parties. 
Randall v. Peerless :JYfotor Car Co., 212 Mass. 
352, 388, 389, 99 N.E. 221; Wa.ucantuck n.fills v. 
Magee Carpet Co., 225 Mass. 31, 33, 113 N.E. 573; 
Conway v. Kenney, 273 11ass. 19, 23, 172 N.E. 
888; J amnhack v. Aamunkoitto Temperance So-
ciety, Inc., 273 Mass. 45, 50, 172 N.E. 884; Peter-
son v. Hopson, 306 ~lass. 597, 602, 29 N .E. 2d 
140, 132 ALR 1; Fine v. Commonwealth, 312 
:Jfass. 252, 254-260, 44 N.E. 2d 659. The distinc-
tion between the power of a judge to correct a 
clerical error and his power to correct a j~tdicial 
error where a final ju,dgment ha,s been entered, 
is without applioation to a case like the p~esent 
where the cas,e has not passed beyond the power 
of the court by reason of the entry of a final 
j1tJdgn~ent. See Karrick v. W ebnore, 210 Mass. 
578, 579-580, 97 N.E. 92; Kingsley v. F'all River, 
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280 Mass. 395, 397~ 398, 18:2 N.E. 841; l)renguber 
v. Agostini, 289 n rass. 222, 223, 193 N.E. 7 43." 
The Sup·ren1e Court of Kansas in the case of 
Farmers and ~Ierchants National Bank of 
ElDorado v. Wright, 157 Pac. 1178, 
likewise carefully made the distinction to which atten-
tion is here directed. In that case a motion for a new 
trial was granted. Several months thereafter a motion 
to vacate the order granting a new trial was filed and 
sustained and it was held that the granting of the new 
trial, being within the jurisdiction of the eourt, retained 
the case on the docket and the court therefor had juris-
diction to make orders therein, including the order va-
cating the previous order granting a new trial. The 
plaintiff in that case contended that it was improper 
and beyond the court's jurisdiction to vacate the order 
granting a new trial and relied on the cases of 
Kingman v. Chubb, 55 Pac. 474, affirmed in 
Missouri Pacific R,ailway Company v. May-
berry, 64 Pac. 981. 
In con1menting on this contention and the authority re-
lied on the Kansas Court says : 
"While it is true that the syllabus states that, 
when a 1notion for ne\v trial has been heard and 
decided, the court has no jurisdiction to recon-
sider at a subsequent term, the facts were that 
the 1notion was denied, and at a subsequent term 
reconsidered and granted. Here we hav~e the op-
p~osit.e. Under the changed Code the n1otion grant-
ing the new trial was properly acted upon at 
chambers, and fran~ that time forward the case 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
remained on the docket ready for trial at t.he 
proper time_. an.d the court had jurisdiction to 
1nJake such orders as wer,e proper. Had there been 
an application to amend pleadings, no question 
could \Vell arise as to the jurisdiction to grant 
such application whether at the next succeeding 
ter1n or later. The case b,eing rightly on the dock-
et} the v~acation of the order granting a new trial, 
while app0alable ?f erron,eou,s, was not void for 
want of jurisdiction." 
This case vvas later follo\ved and affir1ned by the l{ansas 
Court in 
Steward v. l\iarlend Pipeline Co., 297 Pac. 
708, 
\vhere it \Vas held that a trial court at a subsequent term 
1nay set aside an order at a previous term granting a new 
trial. 
~:foreover, it is the general rule in the absence of 
lin1itation by statute that the court may set aside an 
order rna de with respect to a new trial and rehear the 
motion \vith respect thereto. See 
Kentucky C. R. Company v. Smith, 20 S.W. 
392, 18 LRA 63 ; 
Gulf, C and S.FR Co1npany v. Muse, 207 S. 
W. 897,4 ALR 613; 
Browning v. Hof:f1nan, 103 S.E. 484. 
and the annotations set out in 
Annotated Cases, 1913 B 485, 487, and 
Annotated Cases, 1917 C 1151. 
lTinally it should be said that the effect of the Luke 
case is much \veakened by the decision of the Utah 
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Supren1e Court in 
Lund v. Third Judicial District Court, 90 
Utah 433, 62 Pac. 2d 278, 
\vhere it was held that a renewed 1notion for a new trial 
1uay be considered after the first motion has been dis-
posed of where the ruling on the first n1otion was pro-
duc:ed by n1istake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It 
is submitted that on the record here that case is exactly 
in point as appears from the face of the record. 
Finally, we have to submit to the court a case which 
is exactly in point and is, controlling in Utah. This is the 
case of 
Bate1nan v. Donovan, 131 Fed. 2d 759, 
decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on No-
vember 13, 1942 under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. It will be recalled that Utah adopted the Rules 
of Civil Procedure under date of N·ovember 30, 1949 to be 
effective on January 1, 1950, and under familiar rules 
of construction when a statute or rule is adopted from 
another jurisdiction the decisions of the courts of the 
other jurisdictions previously handed down with respect 
thereto are adopted with the rules or statutes. and are 
binding on the Courts of Utah. 
In the BatemaJt case a judgment was entered on a 
verdict by the jury. Within ten days thereafter the ap-
pellant submitted a motion for a n·ew trial which was 
granted. 'Thereafter, and so1ne forty-seven days later, 
the appellee made a motion to vacate the order granting 
a new trial and the court upon consideration of the ap-
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pellee'H 1uotion set aside and vacated the order granting 
a new trial. On appeal this order vacating the order 
granting a ne\v trial vvas cited as error. The Circuit 
Court held that as regards an order granting a new 
trial after verdict, such order being interlocutory and 
not final, since it leaves the case undisposed of, and the 
parties before the court, it 1nay be set aside as erron-
eously granted, and this 1uay be done even after expira-
tion of the tern1. It was held that the lower court was 
acting within the scope of its po\ver in vacating the or-
der for a new trial. '11his case is in point and controlling 
and this court has the right, power and duty to vacate 
the orders granting a new trial herein. 
It should also be observed that under Rule 6'0 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relief may be granted 
fro1n a judgment, order or proceeding entered through 
inadvertence or mistake. :Nioreover, errors in judgment, 
orders and other parts of the record "arising from over-
sight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its o\vn initiative or on the motion of any party 
* * *" These Rules also grant specific authority to the 
court to vacate the orders granting a new trial which 
were erroneously and inadvertently entered as a result 
of a Inistake as to the state of the record. 
We have observed that it would be unjust and un-
reasonable to require 1\fr. Thompson, who is not a rich 
1nan, to sub1nit to the expense of an entirely new trial 
before he should have an opportunity to present his 
grievanee to this court for review. For that reason also 
we feel that the trial court xnust have jurisdiction to 
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vacate its erroneous order~ granting a new trial. This 
court has held that \vhere an order of the trial court 
erroneous in point of law requires a litigant to sub1nit 
to a trial which could not have any valid effect upon the 
rights of the parties, the Sup-re1ne Court would require 
the vacation of the order by 1nandamus if necessary. 
This necessarily presupposes the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to enter the desired corrective order, for Inanda-
Inus will not lie unless the tribunal being co1npelled has 
both jurisdiction and a legal duty to do the required 
act. This point came before this court in a case involving 
venue. In that case, which is very similar to the case 
at bar in its principles, the trial court granted a motion 
f.or a change of venue and thus purportedly divested him-
self of jurisdiction to proceed \Vith the matter, and the 
Supreme Court granted 1nandamus to compel him to re-
call the order and reinstate the case upon his own trial 
docket. See 
Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284, 259 Pac. 928. 
See also 
Phillips Petroleu111 v. Davis, (Okl.) 147 Pac. 
2d 135. . 
Under the law as it exists in this state the trial court 
very properly corrected its inadvertent error and mis-
take by vacating its erroneous orders for a new trial. 
Perhaps we should add one additional bit of author-
ity for logical completeness. It is the established rule in 
Utah as elsewhere that it is in1proper and erroneous for 
the court to make a finding outside the issues as settled 
by the pleading. 
48 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Neuberger v. Robbins, 37 Utah 197, 106 Pac. 
933· 
' 
Skeen v. \ran Sickle, 15 Pac. 2d 344; 
Guiaque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 89', 129 
Pac. 429. 
The trial court properly vacted its erroneous orders 
for a ne'v trial on plaintiff's complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
From what has been said in this brief it is respect-
fully sub1nitted that it is very that apparent there is no 
error in the record as it comes to this ·court and that the 
judg1nent of the trial court below as reinstated by the 
court's order entered on October 13, 1954 should be af-
firmed with costs to respondent. 
R.espectfully submitted, 
YOUN~ THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Att.orneys for D-efenda.nt and Respondent 
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